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IDEOLOGY OR ISOLATIONISM? RUSSIAN IDENTITY AND ITS INFLUENCE
ON ORTHODOX-CATHOLIC RELATIONS
PART III: POPE JOHN PAUL II AND A PROSPECTIVE VISIT TO RUSSIA
by Catherine Clare Caridi
Catherine Clare Caridi (Roman Catholic) has graduate degrees in both Canon Law
(J.C.L., Catholic University of America) and Russian Studies (M.A., Georgetown
University). She practices law and teaches in Northern Virginia. Her regular column
on canonical questions can be read online at Catholic Exchange
(www.catholicexchange.com).
Introduction
In Part I of this article, I discussed the notion of Russian-ness, and the fact that a
traditional facet of being Russian has been membership in the Orthodox Church. Because of
this historical connection, the Western-style notions of freedom of conscience which came
with the collapse of the Soviet Union are challenged by the Russian Orthodox hierarchy, as
contrary to Russian traditions and to historical notions of Russian identity. For this reason,
consequent legislation restricting religion freedoms in Russia have often been publicly
supported by the Moscow Patriarchate.
In Part II, I focused particularly on the activity of the Catholic Church in Russia, and
its renewed ministry to Catholics in a territory where it had been underground for decades. It
was seen that the at-best cool attitude of Russian Orthodoxy toward public practice of the
Catholic faith in Russia is related to the Orthodox leadership’s view that historically, Russian
Orthodoxy alone is the traditional faith of all ethnic Russians. In contrast, the expansion of
Catholic ministry and social outreach within Russian territory is consistent with
Catholicism’s ecclesiological view that one’s faith is not tied to one’s ethnic background or
place of residence. The fact that these two viewpoints stand in opposition to each other is
especially evident with regard to the question of proselytism among the Russian people. The
Russian Orthodox hierarchy accuses Catholic clergy of engaging in proselytizing in
Russia—a charge which the Catholic Church firmly denies.
Now, in the third and final part of this article, I give a case study in point, a concrete
instance in which all the history, culture, politics and theology discussed previously can be
seen to influence the outcome of a particular issue in the world of contemporary Russian
Orthodox-Catholic ecumenical relations. Before his death in 2005, Pope John Paul II was
anxious to travel to Russia, one of the few countries of the world which he had never visited
1 “The Church Loses its Light,” Washington Post, April 3, 2005, p. A34.
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as Pope. While he could have visited the country in his capacity as political head of the
Vatican City State, he insisted that he wished to travel there as head of the Catholic Church.
As such, it was always his practice to obtain first the agreement of a nation’s religious
leaders, and Patriarch Alexei II of Moscow declined to give it, citing as his reason the
problem of proselytism by Catholics among the Russian people. The first section of Part III
will address this issue in further detail, and describe some of the negotiations that have
become public between the Catholic and Orthodox Churches concerning a papal visit to
Russia.
The second section will examine a major reason put forth by the Pope for his desire
to visit Moscow: he wished to return the ancient and historic icon of Our Lady of Kazan,
which had disappeared from Russia during the Bolshevik Revolution, and had later come into
the Pope’s personal possession. Assertions by the Moscow Patriarchate, that this was merely
an excuse being leveraged by the Pope to gain entry into Russia, were in part fueled by
conflicting findings about the authenticity of the icon belonging to John Paul II, and the
consequent significance of its return to Moscow.
The conclusions which I hope the reader will draw from this extended discussion
may by this point be evident, but I will nevertheless end by drawing some brief inferences, in
broad terms, concerning the possible long-term means by which some sort of solution to this
unfortunate situation may be found.
The Well Traveled Pope
Few are unaware that Pope John Paul II, after his election to the papacy in October
1979, quickly became the most widely traveled Pope in the history of the Church. Before his
death in 2005, he visited 129 countries outside Italy, and “was said to have been seen by
more people than anyone else in history.”1
The Pope did not limit his travels to countries with predominantly Catholic, or even
Christian, populations. He visited a number of non-Christian nations, such as Syria, Israel,
and Japan; and a planned trip to Mongolia in 2003 was cancelled only due to John Paul’s
failing health.
In his unique role as both a spiritual leader and the head of an independent country,
Vatican City, the Pope’s protocol for an official visit to a foreign country had two parts. The
2 See, e.g., “”Vatikan: Vizit Papy Rimskogo v Rossiiu nevozmozhen,”, February 23, 2004,
http://lenta.ru./russia/2004/02/2/cardinal_Printed.htm, in which Cardinal Kasper addressed the general reason why
the Pope had not yet visited Russia: “My ne mozhem sdelat’ eto protiv voli Russkoi pravoslavnoi tserkvi. Etot vopros
dolzhen obsuzhdat’sia s Moskovskim Patriarkhatom.”
3Dominik Morawski, , “Towards Moscow,” Inside the Vatican, June/July 1999, p. 16. The author indicated
that he had “base his report on an authoritative study by Russian Orthodoxy specialists in the Vatican.” A year later,
Morawski wrote that “According to reliable Vatican sources, the Patriarchate suffers from a sort of ‘inferiority
complex’ in regard to the Catholic Church, and especially the charismatic John Paul II. The complexity of the present
situation, in fact, derives from intrinsic weaknesses in the Moscow Patriarchate. The Vatican will have to wage a
delicate psychological battle before establishing a normal reciprocal relationship with its Orthodox sister Church in
Russia.” “Why the Orthodox Veto?” Inside the Vatican, July-July 2000, p. 19.
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first requirement, of course, was an official invitation from the political head of state, but
John Paul also refused to travel anywhere without the permission/invitation of the head of the
country’s predominant religion or church. In this way the Pope strove to avoid any
appearance that he was entering the country for the purpose of “stealing” souls away from an
already established national faith.
So long as the Soviet Union was controlled by the Communist Party, which officially
espoused atheism, there was naturally no expectation that the Pope would receive an official
invitation from Party leaders to visit the country. But with the collapse of communism and
the concomitant re-birth of religious freedom, it was hoped that such a visit could ultimately
be arranged.
And an invitation from Russia’s political leadership was not long in coming. The
Pope was actually first invited by Gorbachev, still head of the Soviet Union, during his
historic visit to the Vatican in 1989. Subsequent and multiple invitations to visit Russia came
from both Presidents Yeltsin and Putin, the last during a presidential visit to the Vatican in
November 2003.
Ironically, however, John Paul now had the required invitation from the head of state,
but was unable to obtain approval for a visit from Patriarch Alexei II.2 In 1996 it appeared
that both Moscow and the Vatican were coming close to an agreement concerning a papal
visit and a meeting with the Patriarch. But the arrangement fell through, and the reasons
proffered for the breakdown seem to depend on one’s perspective. Catholic sources have
asserted that “the main obstacle to that meeting [between John Paul and Alexei] was the re-
emergence of Russian nationalism and Patriarch Alexei’s evident identification with the
political alliance of conservative-nationalists in his country.”3 In contrast, Metropolitan
Kirill, in a November 2003 press conference in New York, mentioned that “in 1996, an
agreement had been reached between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Vatican
concerning a meeting... it was all arranged... the Pope and Patriarch would sign a mutual
4 “RPTs gotova obsudit’ vozmozhnosti vstrechi patriarkha s papoi,” November 13, 2003,
www.gazeta.ru/lenta_body.shtml. (My translation.) Kirill did not mention what the “conditions” were that the Vatican
had changed.
5 See, e.g., “Prezident otvechaet za tserkov’,” http://religion.ng.ru/printed/facts/2003-07-
02/1_president.html: “...Patriarkh Aleksii II i drugie oficial’nye litsa v Moskovskoi Patriarkhii zaiavliayut o
nesvoevremennosti vizita Papy v Moskvu v sviazi s protivorechiiaami mezhdu Tserkvami iz-za missionerskoi
deiatel’nosti (prozelitizma) na territorii Rossii...”
6Paul Vallely, “’Still Waiting for Goodwill’: The Tablet Interview with Alexei II, Moscow’s Patriarch,”
February 14, 2004, http://www.thetablet.co.uk/cgi-bin/register.cgi/tablet-00853.
7 While there may have been no official, public statement from the Vatican to this effect until a later date,
the Pope himself made his intention clear during various meetings at the Vatican with both Russian religious leaders
and political officials, including President Putin. See, e.g., http://orthodoxeurope.org/print/7/1/37.aspx: “On January
25, 2002, Pope John Paul II received Metropolitan Pitirim [of Volokolamsk] and Bishop Hilarion [of Kerch] in
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declaration... but not long before the planned meeting, the Vatican struck out of the agreed-
upon text those very conditions upon which depended our future relations.”4
Subsequently, whenever pressed for an explanation for the Russian Orthodox
Church’s refusal to give its approbation to a papal visit, the Moscow Patriarchate cited
difficulties with the Catholic Church’s missionary activities in Russia5, as evidence that it
would not be appropriate for the Pope to visit the country at this time. As Alexei himself
expressed it in an interview with Great Britain’s The Tablet in February 2004, “I myself also
need to justify meeting the Pope. If I simply meet with him in front of TV cameras, then
there will be no concrete improvement in our relationship. My flock will not understand me.
That is why we are saying that such a meeting must be preceded by concrete steps to improve
the relationship between our Churches.”6
At his death on April 2, 2005, Pope John Paul II had made official visits to a number
of countries which had been part of the Soviet Union, including Georgia (November 1999),
Ukraine (June 2001), and Azerbaijan (May 2002). He had also begun to forge closer ties
with other Orthodox leaders in Eastern Europe, perhaps most notably with Patriarch Teoctist
of Romania. But he had not traveled to Russia. Patriarch Alexei had never given his
approval for a papal visit.
An “Excuse” for a Papal Visit? The History of the Icon of Our Lady of Kazan
While the Pope no doubt would have liked to visit Russia simply in order to meet
with Catholic clergy and laity there, as well as to meet and discuss ecumenical relations with
members of the Orthodox hierarchy, he began quietly and diplomatically to make it
increasingly clearer that he had an even greater object in view. John Paul also wished to
come to Russia so that he might personally return the Icon of Our Lady of Kazan to the
Russian Orthodox Church.7
audience. In its course, the Pope of Rome expressed the wish to meet His Holiness Patriarch Alexy II of Moscow and
All Russia to hand him over the Icon of Our Lady of Kazan.”; http://english.pravda.ru/society/showbiz/47906-0,
March 29, 2003: “...following an audience with the Pontiff, Sergei Mironov, of the Russian Federation Council, said...
Pope John Paul II had confirmed his intention to return the Icon of Our Lady of Kazan to Russia.”
8 For a pre-revolutionary Russian history of the icon, the miracles it worked and its connection with Russian
historical events, see, e.g., Skazanie o Iavlennoi Kazanskoi ikone Bozhjei Materi (Moskva, E. Konovalov, 1907). For
a widely cited account by a Catholic priest who was directly involved in the icon’s purchase and preservation by the
Blue Army, see Mowatt, Archpriest John J., The Holy and Miraculous Icon of Our Lady of Kazan (Fatima, Portugal:
Byzantine Center Domus Pacis, 1974). Undoubtedly the most thorough and accurate account of the icon’s
disappearance after the Bolshevik Revolution and its 20th-century journey leading to the Vatican has been published
by Tatarstan journalist Dimitri Khafizov: “Sviatoe znamenie Rossii,” Pravoslavnyi sobesednik 1/4 (2003), pp. 92-147,
also found at http://www.religio.ru/relisoc/138_print.html. The author was involved in two documentary films on the
subject, produced by studios in Russia and in Germany; and has also published a book about the icon, printed in
Tatarstan, which is unfortunately unavailable in the United States. He was a member of the official Tatar commission
authorized to negotiate with the Vatican for the return of the icon to Russia.
9 “…legko, bez bolshogo boia.” Skazanie, p. 24.
10 Mowatt, p. 8, erroneously gives the date as 1790.
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The account of the history of that particular image of Our Lady of Kazan8 which, for
over a decade, had remained in the Pope’s private chapel in the Vatican, could almost have
been culled from a detective novel, for its past is full of uncertainty and intrigue. Its long and
circuitous journey from Russia to Rome, and John Paul’s repeated attempts to return it to
Moscow, could be seen as emblematic of the rocky state of relations between Russian
Orthodoxy and Catholicism since the end of the Soviet Union.
The very origin of the icon, found amid the ruins of a house in Kazan that had burned
down, is said to have been miraculous, for a nine-year-old girl reportedly found the icon in
1579 after the Mother of God appeared to her in a dream and told her where to dig among the
ashes. When miraculous healings began to take place before the icon, Tsar Ivan the Terrible
had a monastery constructed on the site where it had been found, both to commemorate its
discovery and to house the original icon. A number of copies of the icon were made and
taken to other cities in Russia, where some of them also became connected with reports of
miraculous cures.
Consistent with the interplay between Orthodoxy and Russian national identity, the
Icon of Kazan became connected with major historical events in the history of Russia. When,
for example, Russian forces liberated the country from Polish and Lithuanian invaders in
1612 “easily, without a great battle,”9 the icon was being carried with the Russian army.
“The Kazan Icon of the Mother of God was again used as a ‘Victory Banner’ by Tsar Peter
the Great in his battle against the forces of Charles XII of Sweden. The victory climaxed in
the celebrated battle of Poltava in 1709.”10 Later the icon would accompany General
Kutuzov into battle against Napoleon in 1812.
11 Skazanie, Chapter VI, pp. 38-41. To cite another, much more recent example of a historical account of
the icon, “S momenta poiavleniia ikony v Moskve ee istoriia stanovitsia zapitannoi. Chast’ istochnikov utverzhdaet,
chto ... podlinnik... byl vodruzhen v khrame na Krasnoi ploshadi. Drugie soobshchayut, chto original ostavalsia vse-to
vremia v Kazani.” “Nenaprasnyi i nesluchainyi dar,” http://lenta.ru/articles/2005/07/22/kazan/_Printed.htm . The
author does not even mention the third possibility that the original was in St. Petersburg.
12 Mowatt, p. 8.
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Even during the relatively early years of its known existence, the location where the
original icon was kept was already being changed often, as different Tsars ordered it to be
moved at various dates between cathedrals in Kazan, Moscow, and St. Petersburg. At the
same time, numerous copies of the icon continued to be circulated throughout the country and
since they also often came to be regarded as miraculous, confusion subsequently arose as to
which was the original. Accounts that attempt to trace the history of the original icon do not
always agree, and their conclusions as to where the original is now often vary. The Skazanie,
for example, notes that after the Russian military victory in 1612, the original icon was at one
point in a church in Lubianka (in Moscow); then was taken in 1630 to a cathedral named after
it in Kitai-Gorod (now on Red Square, in Moscow); and after Peter the Great’s victory was
removed to St. Petersburg, where over the course of several years it remained in several
different churches, until a cathedral named after the icon was built by Tsar Paul I in the early
1800s specifically to house it.11 The St. Petersburg icon had, meanwhile, been covered with a
jeweled oklad, which the Russian Imperial Government in 1900 estimated to be worth over
35,000 rubles.12 Four years later, the St. Petersburg cathedral was broken into by thieves and
the icon disappeared.
But meanwhile, other priceless, heavily bejeweled versions of the icon had come also
to be considered the original, which would suggest that the one stolen from St. Petersburg
might have merely been a copy. With the passage of the centuries, there were three main
versions of the icon, any—or none—of which might in fact have been the original: the one
housed in St. Petersburg, one in the cathedral on Red Square in Moscow, and one in the
original church in Kazan.
With the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, Russian churches were all too frequently
stripped of their icons and other artistic valuables, which were either destroyed or sold abroad
to finance the new government. Presumably for this reason, the icon in Moscow’s Cathedral
of Our Lady of Kazan disappeared in 1918.
Khafizov notes that the icon which was later in the Vatican was included in a sale of
artwork that was organized by the Bolsheviks in either 1919 or 1920: “In the first years of
13 Khafizov, para 2. (This and all following English quotes from this work are my translations.)
14 During the 1960s, a California art conservation firm examined the icon, and reported that its jeweled
covering contained “663 diamonds totaling about 80 carats; 158 rubies, about 35 carats; 32 emeralds, about 220 carats;
6 sapphires of about 30 carats; and about 150 pearls.” Khafizov. Writing in the 1970s, Mowatt noted that “in 1972,
several hundred more precious stones plus more than one thousand more pearls have been added to the Kazan Icon
here in Fatima.” p. 16.
15 Khafizov notes that “Ia dumayu, chto-to bylo sviazano s vnushitel’noi summoi, kotoruyu prosil za nee
torgovets.... On terpelivo zhdal svoego pokupatelia—bogatogo chudaka ili fanatichnogo kollektsionera.” Para. 6.
16 “Odnim iz poslednikh zhelanii pokoinogo Mitchell-Khedzhesa bylo to, chtoby po vozmozhnosti, sviataia
ikona stala dostupna Russkoi pravoslavnoi tserkvi, no pri etom ne popala by snova pod kontrol’ kommunistov.” Para.
27.
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Soviet power, i.e., between 1917 and 1935, many valuable works of art and antiquities, the
background and history of which it is impossible to trace, were taken abroad out of Russia.”13
It appears that the Kazan icon which was included in the 1919/20 art sale may have been the
one from the Moscow cathedral.
Whether or not the icon found a buyer at this sale is unclear. Given the fabulous
number and size of the jewels in its oklad,14 it would undoubtedly have attracted attention
from potential buyers less interested in the icon itself and its religious and historical
significance, and more in its jeweled covering. What we do know is that a London jeweler
named Norman Weiss somehow obtained the icon in 1928, and immediately offered it for
sale. He does not seem to have found a buyer for many years, possibly because of his high
asking price.15
The icon was purchased 1950 by wealthy British adventurer and art collector
Frederick Albert Mitchell-Hedges, who took it to his castle in Berkshire, England. There,
Russian emigres were able to see the icon, and while some were apparently convinced, based
on their own memories, that it was the icon which had disappeared from St. Petersburg 50
years earlier, others were equally adamant that they had seen this very icon in the cathedral in
Moscow. It should be noted that black-and-white photos still exist of both the icon that had
been in St. Petersburg, and the one in Moscow. The St. Petersburg icon, while similar, can in
fact be seen to differ significantly from the icon owned by Mitchell-Hedges.
When Mitchell-Hedges died in 1959, his adopted daughter Anne inherited the castle
and its contents. Khafizov asserts that one of her father’s last wishes was that the icon be
made accessible to the Russian Orthodox Church, but that it not fall again into the hands of
the communists.16 Anne Mitchell-Hedges subsequently offered the icon for sale to Russian
Orthodox believers in the United States for $500,000, allegedly only the value of its jewels.
The Russian Orthodox Bishop of San Francisco, John Shakhovskoi, arranged that an
internationally known expert on iconography be permitted to examine the icon in England.
17 “Obraz Kazankskoi Bozhiei Materi, poiavivshiisia v Anglii, vo mnogom sovpadaet s sokhranivshimisia
opisaniiami ikony, ischeznuvshei iz Kazani, no razmery ee vse-taki neskol’ko inye...” Khafizov, para 35. The author,
a Russian Orthodox believer, is convinced that the icon in the Vatican was the one that was housed in the Kazan
cathedral in Moscow until shortly after the 1917 Revolution, and that it is in fact the original icon found in 1579.
18 The actual purchase price was never publicly disclosed, and estimates vary widely, starting as low as
$100,000. Khafizov, however, insists that “mne ona izvestna tochno do tsenta: tri milliona dollarov SShA.”
19 Ibid.
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The art historian compared it to known details about the three Kazan icons from St.
Petersburg, Moscow, and Kazan, and among his findings he noted that its dimensions
differed from those of the icon that had been in Kazan.17
Russian Orthodox believers in the United States spent years trying unsuccessfully to
raise the sum required to purchase the icon from Mitchell-Hedges. In 1970, when it became
apparent that Mitchell-Hedges was arranging to sell the icon to a private art collector in
Texas, the U.S. branch of the international lay Catholic organization called the Blue Army of
Our Lady of Fatima stepped in and agreed to purchase the icon for an unspecified sum.18
What was specified from the start, however, was the Blue Army’s intention behind
their purchase. The icon would be held indefinitely on behalf of the Russian people, until the
political situation in the Soviet Union had changed and it would be possible to return it to the
Orthodox Church in Russia, where it rightfully belonged.
Under high security, both because of the icon’s tremendous monetary value and
because of concerns that a robbery might be attempted by the Soviet government, the icon
was transferred to Fatima, Portugal, the site of the Blue Army’s international headquarters. It
was installed in a Byzantine-style chapel there, to await its ultimate return to Russia.
But in the 1990s the icon vanished without explanation from the chapel in Fatima
where it had been held for over 20 years. For a number of years its whereabouts were not
publicly known—until a combination of rumor and quiet remarks made by Pope John Paul II
revealed that it was now in his private chapel in the Vatican.
How had the icon come to be in Rome? In 1993, after the collapse of the Soviet
Union had led to new religious freedoms in Russia, the Blue Army had secretly signed over
the icon to John Paul II, who became its legal owner. This was done with the understanding
that the Pope himself would best be able to negotiate its return to the Orthodox Church in
Russia. According to Khafizov, “this was not the individual initiative of somebody in the
Pope’s entourage. His Holiness himself requested that they bring the icon to Rome, because
he wanted personally to take it back to Russia.”19
20 http://www.russian-orthodox-church.org.ru/ne305196.htm.; see also Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s
account, http://www.ukrweekly.com/Archive/2003/220307.shtml. The proposed papal visit in 2003 would have taken
place on John Paul’s return from a planned trip to Mongolia—a trip which was in any case cancelled for health
reasons.
21 http://www.lenta.ru/russia/2003/06/16/shaimiyev/_Printed.htm : “Dialog mezhdu Russkoi pravoslavnoi
i Rimsko-katolicheskoi Tserkviami ne nuzhdaetsia v posrednikakh.... Nekotorye v Rossii ne zhelayut priezda v
Rossiyu, v chastnosti, v Kazan’, Papy Rimskogo....” (My translation.)
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Again, no public, official statement to this effect was made from the Vatican.
Instead, the Pope clearly preferred quiet diplomacy. He was eager to restore one of Russia’s
most precious icons to its Orthodox hierarchy as a fraternal gesture of good will.
In contrast, the Communications Office of the Department for External Church
Relations of the Russian Orthodox Church issued a very official press statement on May 19,
2003.20 Noting that a recent examination of the icon in the Vatican by art experts from the
Russian Federation Ministry of Culture had determined that the icon “is a 18th-century copy”
of the original, the statement described it merely as “one of many which were in the liturgical
usage and were illegally taken out of the country in the years of upheavals.” Many such
icons had already been returned to Russia, and therefore “the attempts to link the returning of
this icon with the question of a visit of the Pope of Rome to Russia are astonishing, the more
so that the Vatican has not negotiated such a visit with the Russian Orthodox Church.”
Repeating previous assertions that the Catholic Church first had to renounce proselytism in
Russia, the statement added that “the Vatican’s policy is aimed at aggravating the existing
problems.”
Once again, negotiations were at an impasse. The Moscow Patriarchate downplayed
the historical significance of the Kazan icon in the Vatican, and continued to refuse to
approve a papal visit to Russia without the Catholic Church first renouncing its proselytizing
practices.
Not everyone in Russia agreed with Patriarch Alexei’s position. Attempts by the
president of Tatarstan (the capital of which is Kazan) to establish dialogue with the Vatican
were the subject of public criticism from the Moscow Patriarchate in the same year. Noting
that ecumenical dialogue between the two Churches “was in no need of a mediator,” the
spokesman for the Patriarchate asserted that “some in Russia don’t want to see the Pope come
to Russia, and to Kazan in particular.”21
In August of the following year, Itar-Tass reported that Patriarch Alexei told
President Putin that since the Kazan Icon in the Vatican “is one of many copies, not the
original miracle-working image that disappeared at the beginning of the 20th century,” “for
2 2 Q u o t e d i n t h e S t . P e t e r s b u r g T i m e s , A u g u s t 1 7 , 2 0 0 4 ,
http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action_id=2&story _id=1311.
23 “Papa Rimskii Ioann Pavel II segodnia spervye publichno ob’iavil o namerenii peredat’ Russkoi
pravoslavnoi tserkvi spisok ikony Kazanskoi Bozhei materi, kotoraia khranilas’ do sikh por v lichnykh pokoiakh
pontifika.” “Papa Rimskii poobeshchal vernut’ Rossii ikonu Kazanskoi Bogomateri,”
http://lenta.ru/world/2004/08/22/icon/_Printed.htm
24 “...eta ikona ‘emu ochen’ doroga,’ poskol’ku ona ‘stala svidelitsei vsekh ego kazhdodnevnykh trudov.’”
Ibid. (My translation.)
25 Quoted in La Civiltà Cattolica, October 16, 2004. (My translation.)
26 “Moskovskii Patriarkhat poblagodaril Vatikan za ‘simvolicheskii akt’ vozvrazheniia v Rossiyu ‘odnogo
iz pozdnikh spiskov Kazanskoi ikony Bozhei Materi’ i teper’ ozhidaet ‘bolee znachimykh’ shagov, napravlennykh
na uregulirovanie otnoshenii mezhdu Tserkvami.” “RPTs zhdet ot Vatikana ‘bolee znachimykh’ shagov,” September
1, 2004, http://www.lenta.ru/russia/2004/08/26/church/_Printed.htm. (My translation)
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that reason there is no need for the pope himself to bring it.”22 It is interesting to note that
from this point on, any mention by Orthodox sources of the Kazan icon in the Vatican
invariably describes it as a “spisok,” or a copy.
Shortly thereafter, Pope John Paul for the first time made a public statement about his
intention to hand the icon over to the Russian Orthodox Church.23 But by now it had become
clear to the Pope that, between his increasingly serious health problems and the intransigence
of the Moscow Patriarch, a papal visit to Russia was not going to take place. Instead, John
Paul arranged that a delegation of members of the Catholic hierarchy, led by Cardinal Walter
Kasper of the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity, would return the
icon—which the Pope said had become “dear to me personally, since she became the witness
of all my daily troubles”24—to the Orthodox hierarchy in Moscow on August 28, 2004.
On that date the icon was formally handed over to Patriarch Alexei II in a ceremony
in the Cathedral of the Dormition, in the Kremlin. Accompanying the icon was a letter to the
Patriarch from the Pope, noting that he was sending the Catholic delegation with the icon “in
joy and in sentiments of communion that animate me and that have animated my
Predecessors...the Mother of God, in her holy icon known as “Kazanskaya,” has reunited
around her the Orthodox faithful, as well as their faithful Catholic brothers from other parts
of the world....”25
In response, Alexei thanked the Vatican for this “symbolic act” of returning to Russia
“one of the late copies of the Kazan Icon of the Mother of God,” adding that now he awaited
from Catholics “more meaningful” steps toward regularizing relations between the two
Churches.26 Proselytizing was mentioned yet again as a key problem hindering ecumenical
relations.
The icon was not taken either to the Kazan Cathedral on Red Square, or to the
Cathedral in St. Petersburg. According to press reports, it was moved for the time being to
27 “Spisok ikony Kazanskoi Bozhiei materi budet poka khranit’sia v domovom khrame rabochei rezidencii
Aleksiia II v Chistom pereulke. ‘Potom budem reshat’. Esli budet vosstanovlen monastyr’ na meste iavleniia
chudotvornoi ikony v Kazani, obraz mozhet byt’ peredan emu.’” “Delegatsiia Vatikana peredala Aleksiyu II
Kazanskuyu ikonu Bozh’ei materi,” September 1, 2004, http://www.lenta.ru/russia/2004/08/28/icon/_ Printed.htm
28 See, among others, “Sviateishii Patriarkh Moskovskii i vseia Rusi Aleksii II peredal gradu Kazani spisok
proslavlennoi ikonyBozhiei Materi,” http://www.mospat.ru/print/trips/id/9758.html ; and “Akt o peredache chtimogo
spiska Kazanskoi ikony Bozhei Materi Kazanskoi eparkhii Russkoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi,”
http://www.mospat.ru/print/week/id/9759.html.
29 “Segodnia musul’mansko-khristianskii dialog iavliaetsia odnim is prioritetnykh napravlenii
mezhreligioznoi deiatel’nosti Russkoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi.” “Slovo Sviateishego Patriarkha Moskovskogo i vseia
Rusi Aleksiia II posle Bozhestvennoi liturgii v Blagoveshenskom sobore Kazanskogo Kremlia.”
http://www.mospat.ru/print/appearances/id/9760.html
30 “Zamechatel’nym primerom vzaimoponimaniia pravoslavnykh i musul’man stal fakt podderzhki
initsiativy vvedenia novogo gosudarstvennogo prazdnika—Dnia narodnogo edinstva, kotoryi promyslitel’no sovpadaet
s dnem prazdnovaniia Kazanskoi ikony Bozhiei Materi ustanovlennym nashei Tserkov’yu v chest’ pobedy nad
inozemnymi okkupantami v 1612 godu.” Ibid.
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the house chapel at the Patriarch’s residence in Moscow, and the Patriarch suggested that it
might in the future be taken to Kazan, to the monastery currently being reconstructed on the
site of the discovery of the original icon.27
Almost a year later, on July 21, 2005, Alexei took the icon to Kazan, where he took
part in celebrations to observe the 450th anniversary of Kazan’s Orthodox eparchy. In a
ceremony in the cathedral within the Kazan Kremlin, in the presence of Tatar President
Shaimiev—who had been chastised two years earlier by Orthodox officials for his attempts to
help engage the Vatican in regular ecumenical dialogue with the Russian Orthodox
Church—the Patriarch handed over what was, in official press releases, termed “a copy of the
Kazan Icon of the Mother of God.”
In the numerous reports on this event found on the Moscow Patriarchate’s official
web-site, there was no mention of the fact that this icon had been returned to Moscow by the
Catholic Church.28 While the Patriarch did take this occasion to mention dialogue with those
of other faiths, his speech was directed entirely to the Muslim population of Tatarstan, to
whom Alexei gave assurances that “Muslim-Christian dialogue is a primary inter-religious
activity of the Russian Orthodox Church.”29 As was seen in Part I, the term “Christian” was
in this context plainly synonymous with “Orthodox.” The Patriarch also cited, as an example
of successful inter-religious dialogue with Islam, the fact that a new state holiday had been
established, commemorating the 1612 victory of Russian forces, carrying the Kazan Mother
of God, over “foreign occupiers”30 — Polish and Lithuanian Catholics.
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Conclusion
While the Moscow Patriarchate and the Vatican have been talking with each other
once again since 2004, no one can honestly describe the relationship between the two
Churches as a good one. Communications continue to be characterized by, on the Orthodox
side, a mistrust that Catholics can easily construe as hostility and defensiveness; and on the
Catholic side, by a very public display of openness that Orthodox can construe as a sense of
superiority. While the hierarchy of each Church officially describes the other as a “sister”
Church, and they continue to congratulate and wish each other well on feast days and other
special occasions (such as the election of Pope Benedict XVI in April 2005), relations remain
cold, even if no longer actually frozen.
But the Russian Orthodox Church’s position vis-à-vis Catholicism is not only
consistent with its position toward other faiths which appear to be attracting believers from
among the Russian population—it is also indicative of the disagreement that has once again
come to the fore in Russia about the Russian identity. What does it mean to be a Russian?
What should be Russia’s relationship to the West, both politically and culturally? And how
much freedom can (and should) Russia accept without its citizenry developing into a body
that is so diverse that it is no longer recognizable as uniquely Russian?
These are questions that have been debated by Russians for generations, and the fact
that the terms “Slavophile” and “Westernizer” long ago became part of Russia’s vocabulary
provides proof that the arguments became standard ones that are still far from settled. With
the demise of the communist regime and the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russians now face
the question of where to establish the parameters of their newfound freedom. The initial rush
to embrace any and all facets of Western political democracy and economic capitalism has
been tempered, in the minds of many, with the realization that some of the consequences of
freedom appear to be eroding the populace’s sense of Russian-ness. So long as a significant
percentage of Russia’s population sees this as a problem, the battle between openness
(primarily to the West) and a striving to maintain cultural traditions will continue. The
difficulties seen between Russian Orthodoxy and Catholicism are a symptom of this battle
that is being fought, not so much between Russians and non-Russians, as among the Russian
people themselves. And until Russians can establish as a body what their position toward
other faiths should be, and how much freedom Russian citizens should have to act in accord
with their consciences, the historical pattern of alternating periods of openness and restriction
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(seen earlier in this paper) will continue, not only toward the Catholic Church, but to those of
other faiths ministering within Russia’s borders as well.
The Russian Orthodox Church, as an institution with tremendous historical and
cultural importance to the Russian people, must establish its position on this question within
the framework of Orthodox theology. And the hierarchy may find itself obliged to occupy a
position within the country that is historically less socially important than in the past, but one
that is consistent with its theological understanding of the teachings of other Christian but
non-Orthodox Churches. Additionally, given the questions and persistent rumors regarding
the infiltration of the Church by the Soviet government, care should be taken by Orthodox
officials to show the public that the Church’s position on this issue is in fact being driven by
theological, rather than political motivations.
Meanwhile, Catholics ministering within Russia’s borders must constantly be
mindful of this ongoing discussion among Russians about the Russian identity and the role of
non-Russian cultural elements within the country. As Catholicism has learned to adapt to the
cultural conditions of countries throughout the world in the past, its leadership must now be
similarly aware that the methods and means employed in Catholic ministry in European
countries may well be entirely unsuited to Russia’s environment, and that Russians’ initial
embrace of all things Western does not imply that Russia is simply another European
country, that will automatically accept Catholicism as part of its culture like the rest.
Catholics should not forget that remembrance of historical military conflicts between
Catholic Poland and Orthodox Russia may very well still color the attitudes of Russians
toward the Catholic Church—a Church that was headed until recently by a Pope who
described himself publicly as a “son of Poland.”
In general, it is important ever to keep in mind that the standpoint of each Church, of
Russian Orthodoxy and Catholicism, is grounded in both centuries of historical events that
have shaped a particular cultural mindset, and a theological perspective that developed in
great part from that very same historical and cultural framework. Neither side, in other
words, can be expected simply to change its mind, as if its current stance on ecumenical
relations is merely one of several equally plausible positions. If the two Churches are to
reach some sort of common accord, both will be required to inch forward, gradually and
slowly, in order to meet somewhere at a middle point which is currently the position held by
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neither one. This implies that each Church’s viewpoint will have to change, at least
somewhat, and neither will in the end achieve everything that it now desires.
Making such concessions will be difficult enough even under the best of
circumstances and with all the parties involved having the best of intentions. But no
compromise will ever be reached if the leadership of either Church fails at least to try to
appreciate the theological position and cultural heritage of the other, because without some
degree of mutual understanding, any agreement will be impossible. And without a sincere
desire on the part of each to strive to understand the other, so as to begin to work together
rather than as competitors or enemies, any consensus will likewise remain elusive.
